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ABSTRACT

K. Burke's (1945) pentad identifies five contributing factors in any communication event: agent, purpose, act, scene, and agency. Using the pentad as an organizational schema, this paper summarizes problems in methods used by behavioral researchers to study the deceptive communication event. The paper argues that fragmenting the communication act into separate research variables reduces the ability to understand how several variables combine to produce the total effect of deception. The paper then summarizes these variables in a model intended to make their interrelationships more obvious, and concludes with a call to consider deception as a rhetorical event by applying Burke's pentadic "ratio" method to naturally occurring examples of deceptive communication. (HOD)

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Deception: A Dramatistic Review of the Research Towards a New Theoretical Model

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Deception: A Dramatistic Review of the Research
Towards a New Theoretical Model

Abstract

Using Burke's pentad as an organizational schema, the review summarizes problems in methods used by behavioral researchers to study the deceptive communication event. A model summarizing variables which might be considered to affect the deceptive communication event is offered. The reviewer calls for consideration of the rhetorical nature of deception and the interrelationship of these variables by applying Burke's "ratio" method of analysis in future deception research.

Deception: A Dramatistic Review of the Research Towards a New Theoretical Model

Laura sits carefully polishing her collection of glass animals, her menagerie. Slowly, almost painfully, Amanda enters the room, her whole demeanor crying out hurt and bewilderment.

"Deception? Deception?"

As the scene unfolds, the audience learns what Amanda has learned, that for weeks Laura has been leading her mother to believe she has been attending typing classes when in truth she has been going to the movies, visiting the zoo and the botanical gardens.

"You did this all to deceive me, just for deception? Why?"

"Mother, when you're disappointed, you get that awful suffering look on your face, like the picture of Jesus' mother in the museum!...I couldn't face it."

Tennessee Williams' dream play A Glass Menagerie is a showcase for deception. At an internal level, each character is deceiving him/herself about possibilities for his/her future. The characters Amanda, Laura, and Tom participate in carefully orchestrated deceptions of each other, like the scene introducing this paper. The actress playing the role on the stage is engaged in deceiving the audience into willingly "suspending disbelief" so that, for a time, she is Laura. And, if the performance is inadequate, the audience

will deceive the actor by applauding anyway. The rich complexity of the construct "Deception" has made it a focus for study by "social scientists" of the theatre as well as social psychologists and communication scholars. This paper makes use of the dramatistic metaphor as a way to review a significant and growing body of research about deceptive communication.

The selection of a dramatistic metaphor is supported by Goffman's seminal works on impression management, cited in many articles and books reviewed for this study. In particular, Knapp and Comadena (1979) use the dramatistic metaphor for their review of the literature, categorizing operational definitions of the deception paradigm by "Actors", "Motivation", "Occasion", "Time", "Nature of Deceptive Messages", and "Detection". DePaulo and Rosenthal (1979) proposed four dramatistic foci for deception research: "lies", "liars", "lie detectors", and "social settings". More recently, Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal (1981) implicitly used a dramatistic perspective in their comprehensive review of the literature when they define the act of deception as an interaction between deceiver (actor) and lie detector (audience).

This review argues that failure to visualize the deceptive communication event as a total dramatic performance has prevented researchers from identifying, with confidence, the variables or combination of variables which affect the success of the performance.

The majority of the studies under review in this study of research into the nature of the deceptive communication event apply a behavioral analysis method. That is, the researchers operationalize "deception" as the manifestation by the deceiver of certain behaviors which may, by skilled or sensitive observers, be taken to mean something other than their apparent or surface values. Most of these studies assume the definition of deception given by Knapp and Comadena (1979): "the conscious alteration of information a person believes to be true in order to significantly change another's perceptions from what the deceiver thought they would be without the alteration." (p. 271). Alteration can occur by omitting, distorting, or fabricating information. Most behavioral scientists avoid semantic problems by accepting that the deceiver manipulates truth, as he sees it, to change the impressions he assumes his audience would have of that truth. The focus of deception implicit in this definition is on the behaviors of the deceiver and the deceived.

Zuckerman et al (1981)contend that deception detection is a necessary complement to deception. Their studies have attempted to measure the ability of the receiver to detect the deceiver's attempt to alter "truth". Kraut (1980), however, argued that the focus of research should be on the deceiver. From his review of relevant literature, he concluded, "All these data suggest that a liar's performance rather than the observer's skill is the fundamental determinant of deception detection. Individual differences

in perceivers' skill or decision rules seem minor in comparison" (p. 214).

Regardless of the focus of study, on deceiver or detection by the deceived, weaknesses in the behavioral approach to deceptive communication research are revealed when a dramatistic analysis method is employed. This review will use Burke's (1945) pentad as an organizational schema to illuminate several methodological problems inherent in a behavioral approach to understanding deception communication.

The pentad identifies five contributing factors in any communication event: "Agent", "Purpose", "Act", "Scene", and "Agency". Burke's method isolates each element of the pentad and then seeks an understanding of the communication event in which they occur by considering the relationships or "ratios" these elements have with one another. This review will approach the research in deceptive communication as a unit of communication by identifying the five pentadic elements. Continuing the analysis by elucidating possible ratios between these elements is beyond the scope of the present study. For purposes of this analysis, then, "Agent" will be taken to include the deceivers (performers), the deceived (audience), their skills and attributes. "Purpose" will discuss the motives of the participants in the deceptive communication event and their evaluations of that event. "Act" will include type, content, duration, and occasional context of the deceptive event. "Scene" will consider in greater detail the context or situation of the communicative

event and how context encourages or discourages the ecological validity of the research design of the studies sampled. Finally, "Agency" will summarize how researchers have selected a channel or medium or combinations of channels and media for analysis: physiological, visual, or audio-lingual.

Since comprehensive reviews of the results of studies in deceptive communication are available (see Knapp and Comadena, 1979 and Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal, 1981), this study will focus on a critique of method. An argument is made that fragmenting the communication act into separate research variables reduces the ability to understand how several variables combine to produce the total effect of deception. These variables are summarized in a model intended to make their inter-relationships more obvious. The review concludes with a call to conside deception as a rhetorical event by applying Burke's pentadic "ratio" method to naturally occurring examples of deceptive communication.

Agents

Performers

One difficulty in generalizing results from a body of deception literature to the general population comes from the lack of diversity in populations sampled by the research.

Behavioral experimenters typically create an example of deceptive behavior by overtly or covertly stimulating a deceptive reaction from college students. For example, the Manaugh, Wiens, Matarazzo (1970) design asked subjects to lie about their number of years of education in an interview. The Exline, Thibaut, Hickey, Gumpert (1970) design covertly implicated the subjects in a cheating episode, then measured their reactions to threatened exposure in a follow-up interview.

Several researchers selected particular college students as performers. Ekman and Friesen (1972) submitted female nursing students to experimental conditions designed to produce deceptive messages. Hocking, Kaminski, Bauchner, and Miller (1979) selected criminal justice majors to create videotapes of deceptive messages. Knapp, Hart, and Dennis (1974) selected college students who were veterans.

A minority of the studies reviewed used subjects who were not college students as deceptive performers. One of the seminal studies by Ekman and Friesen in 1969 focused on deceptive messages generated by female inpatients at a psychiatric hospital. Feldman's (1980) deceivers were urban Koreans of various ages. Kraut and Poe (1980) operationalized their study using customs inspectors and

travelers. Mayano (1980) observed the deceptive behaviors of professional poker players in Las Vegas and Gardena, California. Littlepage and Pineault (1981) included secretaries in their design.

None of the studies reported training performers; that is, providing information about how to enhance their deceptive performances; however, some studies reported manipulating detection by providing information to assist the audience in the detection of deceptive performances. For example, Geizer and Rarick (1977) used four selections from the "To Tell the Truth" television program in which only one performer was not lying; thus, decoding audience subjects could use elimination as a process for determining the truthful performer.

Ekman and Friesen (1972) and Hocking and Leathers (1980) considered that differences in the deceptive abilities of performers might affect the accuracy scores of audience members. However, none of the studies reported here attempted to measure the skill of the performer in sending specific messages before inducing the deceptive situation. This factor alone could account for the discrepancies in results across studies; however, researchers who used videotapes repeatedly, like Brandt, Miller, and Hocking (1980), Hocking and Leathers (1980), and Brandt, Miller, and Hocking (1982); and the series of tests drawn from the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS) test by Rosenthal, Zuckerman, and DePaulo and their colleagues reported that they attempted to select samples of performers who were

highly skilled or poorly skilled deceivers for subsequent studies. Unfortunately, the criterion for selecting these samples was the performance of the original audience. If discrepant results were obtained on the subsequent study, it would be difficult to determine which audience represented the a-typical sample.

Audience

DePaulo and her colleagues' emphasis on the audience partner in the deceptive communication interaction, the "human lie detector", gained support from the discovery by Hopper and Bell (1984) of a "Detectability" dimension to the notion of deceptive communication.

Two basic designs for decoding the generated deceptive messages emerge from the research reviewed; one using naive or "trained" college students, the other using "trained" observers. "Training" is provided when the experimenter tells the audience the number of or percentage of deceptive messages occurring in the experiment, as in the Geizer and Rarick (1977) design; or when the experimenter instructs the audience to look for certain kinds of behaviors during the exposure, as in Zuckerman et al (1979) when decoders were instructed to concentrate on facial cues. Familiarity with a "baseline" of honest behavior is another kind of "training" which is manipulated to affect the detection accuracy of audiences. For example, Brandt, Miller, and Hocking (1980) varied the number of truthful samples decoding audiences saw so that they became familiar, in controlled degrees, to the lying performer's honest behavior. However, as DePaulo

(1982) notes, the design in which the audience is made suspicious or alerted to the possiblity of deception is inherently flawed, since alternative explanations for the behavior the audience observes are immediately discouraged.

Attributions

Several studies attempted to distinguish deceptive communication skills on the basis of attributions of the participants. The most common attributional distinction was made between males and females. Hall (78) completed a meta-study of 75 research designs in which distinction was made between male and female performers and audience decoders. Sexual distinctions in deception skill are confounded, however, by measurable differences in nonverbal skills between men and women. Feldman (1979) offered a cross-cultural observation of deception skills when he operationalized his "good drink/bad drink" design with urban Koreans in the first grade, seventh grade, and college. Several studies differentiated deception skills on the basis of age; for example, Parham, Feldman, Oster, and Popoola (1981) compared college subjects with elderly subjects to measure deception skill differences.

Several studies used standardized instruments to measure personality characteristics, seeking to make correlations with deception skill. Exline et al (1970), among others, considered a possible correlation between deception skill and Machiavellianism. Cunningham (1977) specifically focused on personality variables including extroversion, neuroticism, social desirability, mood change, and self-monitoring.

Lavrakas and Maier (1979) considered a range of personality and life style differences including social intelligence, field dependence, number of siblings, and hours spent watching television. Most recently, researchers have incorporated Norton's "communicator style" measurement into deceptive communication designs: Wood and Young (1983) and Cody and O'Hair (1983).

Identification of attributional variables by deception researchers suggests that the research question the studies are designed to answer is which traits make one skillful at deceiving or detecting deception. An equally valuable question might be under what conditions is an individual more stimulated to produce deceptive communication or more sensitive to detect it? Further study might profit from pursuing the second question in conjunction with the first.

Another question about the validity of behavioral designs issues from consideration of what behaviors are generally associated with deceptive communication. Ekman and Friesen (1969) perhaps confounded their study by using particularly unpleasant, stress-producing stimuli for the performers. Mehrabian (1971) introduced a possible correlation between negative affect and deception which also underlies the studies conducted by Zuckerman, DePaulo, Rosenthal, and their colleagues. The assumption that a stressful performance or one to which an audience assigns a negative impression constitutes the same behaviors as deception might be considered to fall into the same fallacy of non sequitur which some researchers assign to the use of

the polygraph to detect guilt (Podlesny and Raskin, 1977). Indeed, successful deceivers like con men (Hankiss, 1980) and poker players (Hayano, 1980) are not reported to exhibit behaviors typically associated with stress or guilt, and, in fact, their victims report a highly positive impression from the interaction with the deceptive performer.

Discrepancy between "honest" and "deceptive" behaviors is frequently cited as a determining factor used by audiences to identify deception. As early as 1964, Gustafson and Orne argued that when detecting deception, the audience decoder became aware of behavior that differed from the normal behavior of the performer. Not only do few studies provide a "baseline" of honest behavior for the audience decoder to compare the deceptive sample against, few studies provide direct interaction between performer and audience at all. The earliest study reviewed here, Fay and Middleton, 1941, generated deceptive messages over a public address system for listening audiences to decode. Harrison, Hwalek, Raney, and Fritz (1978) sought to distinguish private deception from public deception by separating the communicators with a wall. Most deception studies assumed a "two-step flow" model, wherein audiences responded to mediated communication in the form of mechanically reproduced audial, visual, or audio-visual samples of communication behavior. In the most extreme manipulations of the relationship, like Hocking, Kaminski, Bauchner, and Miller's (1979) study, one group of audience decoders was provided with only a transcript of the interaction between the performer and a research

confederate. None of the studies reviewed operationalized a deceptive communication event between performers and audience decoders who were familiar with each other. The inclusion of a degree of intimacy variable in the deception paradigm might more accurately operationalize the notion of a "social contract" (Goffman, 1959), or "interpretive flexibility" (DePaulo, Zuckerman, Rosenthal, 80) in social interaction.

As early as 1968, Maier and Thurber suggested that the physical presence of the interviewer with the performer confounded his ability to detect the deception by offering too much meta-communication information. They forwarded as a "real world" example of "meta-communication overload" cases in which a higher court had overturned the decision of a jury, based on consideration of the trial transcription alone. The dominant research model, however, in the literature sample reviewed here assumes that visual and audial behaviors provide an audience with necessary information to determine the veracity of the performer. Discovering which of these behaviors or what combination of behaviors provide key clues to deception has been the dominant research problem throughout the deception research paradigm.

Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance, and Rosenthal (1979) have suggested another potential complication for behavioral researchers: a bias or tendency on the part of some individuals to appear honest ("demeanor bias"), or to decode others as honest or deceitful regardless of behavioral cues ("receiver bias"). These biases might obviate other personal

attributes, disregard the context of the deceptive communication event, and generally obfuscate experimental results. This study located no measurement system to date to identify encoding or decoding biases.

As Hocking et al (1979) and Hocking and Leathers (1980) noted, establishing criteria for identifying deceptive behaviors has been the most difficult and frustrating task for deception researchers. Regardless of the attributional differences or manipulation of agent conditions, most researchers have been able to achieve accuracy in detecting deception which only slightly exceeds chance (Knapp and Comadena, 79).

Purpose

Further confounding the identification of a "vocabulary" of deceptive behaviors is the artificial inducement of deceptive communication in many research designs. The purpose or motive of the deceiver to be successful in his performance, or the audience to detect the deception is seldom given serious consideration. Most studies reported rewarding subjects who participated in generating deceptive messages with cash or course credit. Some studies, like Weiler and Weinstein (1972), offered an incentive for successful deception in the form of a cash bonus or a career enhancement. Mehrabian (1971) threatened to shock unsuccessful deceivers. The series of studies using the Exline, Thibaut, Hickey, Gumpert (70) design depended on the appeal to personal honor with the concomitant threat of

shame and humiliation at discovery to induce deceptive behavior.

Hopper and Bell (1984) labeled the first of three dimensions of the deceptive communication event "Premeditation", a term which could describe the extent to which the deceptive performer considers the consequence of his action. In the studies reviewed here, "Premeditation" is assumed to correlate with an intensification of anxiety, an affect presumed to contribute to behaviors associated with deception by observers. However, many studies obviate the effect of premeditation by operationalizing spontaneous deception situations in which the performer has no opportunity to plan his behavior. For example, the McClintock and Hunt (1975) study provided for performers to receive audible instructions to lie through an earphone intercom during the course of an interview. A few studies, like Ekman and Friesen (1974) and Knapp, Hart, and Dennis, (1974) provided the performer with time and/or information to prepare his deceit in a posed deception situation. Caution should therefore be used when comparing the results of these two manipulations: in effect, they measure two different deception situations. Just as Lykken (1974) argued for an awareness of a continuum of consequence in interpreting the physiological tests of deception associated with the polygraph; so, ten years later, do Hopper and Bell suggest a continuum of deceptive behaviors, rather than a polarity between posed and spontaneous behaviors, distinguished by the degree of the consequence of detection perceived by the

performer.

The corresponding "purpose" or consequence for an audience member to detect a deception is seldom considered in research designs, although Zuckerman, DePaulo and their colleagues have focused attention on the detection aspect of the paradigm. Few studies offered a reward or incentive for the audience to correctly discover the deception attempt of the performer. Ekman and Friesen (1972) suggested a practical benefit to deception detection skills for the medical profession. The Hocking et al studies take into consideration the practicality of deception detection skills for the field of criminal law. Kraut and Poe (1980) applied the detection model to customs officials who would have utility for increased detection skills.

Not only does consideration of motivation for an audience to detect the performer merit more study, but a distinction might be made between the ability to detect and the motivation to expose the performer. As DePaulo (1981) observed, socialization processes encourage audiences, especially women and increasingly with age, to ignore deception when they detect it, out of a sense of politeness, as if the ability to detect the deception were a kind of eavesdropping.

More attention has been placed on the response of the audience to the detected deception, than on motivation to detect deception. Mehrabian's (1972) discovery that detectors assigned negative affects to deceiving performers, and subsequently disliked those liars may offer only one

example of a range of possible responses to a perceived deception available to an audience. Hopper and Bell's (1984) second dimension of deception, "Evaluation", considers a range of responses from benign to exploitive (after Goffman, 1959). New research models might consider the audience's evaluation of the deceptive message to range along a continuum from harmless and therefore inconsequential and requiring no response, to threatening and therefore requiring a defensive posture or response.

From a dramatistic, and rhetorical, perspective, it might be more valuable to view the deceptive communication event as successful or unsuccessful persuasion. Thus, the deceiver/rhetor is successful in creating the illusion of truth he intends when he is <u>not</u> detected or exposed: the most successful actor is the one who encourages his audience to accept, for a time, that he <u>is</u> the character he portrays. From a communication perspective, deception is rhetorical in nature, as Knapp, Hart, and Dennis (1974) suggest. The deceptive performer is in essence engaged in dialectic with his audience, seeking to forward the position or attitude he supports, whether that position is true to the facts of the matter or not. Mehrabian's (1971) distinction between deception and persuasion on the basis of negative or positive affective response by the audience appears to be an artificial one when we view deception from the rhetorical perspective.

The debate whether the proper focus of study in

deception research should be on the deceiver or on the deceived, and the lack of serious consideration given to the motivations and consequences of deception suffer from an assumption that the deceptive communication is a "sparring event" rather than a "collaborative event", as Kraut (1978) has delineated the two positions, after Goffman (1959). That audiences are willing participants in the deceptive communication event might be intuited from observing the responses of soap opera fans to the actors who portray popular characters in the stories. Hankiss (1980) theorized, from her observation of confidence men, that psychodynamic principles other than reason operate on the audience during a deceptive communication event. Defense mechanisms which come to life when self-image is threatened prevent the "mark" from admitting he has been deceived. Social norms impose an emotional burden of guilt on the one who exposes a liar. Studies like Hankiss (1980) and DePaulo (1980) tend to confirm Goffman's (1959) notion of a "social contract", written in our communication patterns, which permits us to exchange factual and affective information, and even lies, with a minimum of threat of exposure.

In their meta-analysis, Zuckerman et al (1981) admitted the limitations of a strictly behavioral approach to deceptive communication research: "...the extent to which behavior is interpreted as deceptive or honest may depend as much on the detector as on the behavior itself (p. 39." Hankiss (1980) suggested that the relationship between roles

of performer and audience decoder influences how meaning is assigned to a behavioral interaction. When research focuses on how the communication is taken, rather than how the communication manifests itself, a new more rhetorical view of deceptive communication surfaces.

Act

The act of deception includes the topic of the deception, fact or affect; saliency of the topic of deception to the participants; and duration of the deceptive communication.

Some of the studies reviewed created deceptive communication events of a factual nature, like the falsification of number of years of education during an interview (Manaugh, Wiens, and Matarazzo, 1970). Most of the studies reviewed, however, focused on deceptions of an affective nature, ranging from high involvement topics, like one's opinion about abortion (Mehrabian, 1971) to low involvement topics, like one's opinion of the flavor of a beverage (Feldman, 1978). In some studies, the topic of deception was artificially determined or manipulated by the experimenter. For example, in the Lavrakas and Maier (1979) study, performers were given the assignment to describe a task they had performed as either interesting or dull, regardless of their true opinion. In other studies, the performers selected, to some degree, the topic of deception. In Elliott's (1979) study, students rated a choice of topics in terms of their personal opinions; then students indicating a strong support for the legalization

of marijuana were selected to create honest or deceptive messages expressing their opinions.

Bok (1978) offered a taxonomy of types of lies which suggests that deception encompasses a much broader range than a simple distinction between deceptions of fact and deceptions of affect. Her essay identifies "white lies", "excuses", "justification", "lies in a crisis", "lying to liars", "lying to enemies", "lies protecting peers and clients", "lies for the public good", "paternalistic lies", and "lies to the sick and dying". DePaulo and Rosenthal (1979) also suggested a division of kinds of lies. Naming kinds of lies illustrates another difficulty in generalizing across deception studies. Just as critics from Aristotle (The Poetica) to Esslin (The Theatre of the Absurd, 1961) have applied different "rules" of analysis to different types of dramatic acts (ie. tragedy, comedy, melodrama, theatre of the absurd), deception researchers, also, might find it valuable to qualify the type of deception they are studying. Perhaps, as in the dramatistic model, different "rules" of analysis apply to different types of lies.

Some manipulation of deception content has been performed in order to increase the saliency of the deceptive act for the performer and audience. While Ekman and Friesen (1972) warned that increased salience might produce an undesirable degree of anxiety which might confound the search for deceptive behavioral clues, several research teams (Knapp, Hart, and Dennis, 1974; and Hocking, Kaminski, Bauchner, and Miller, 1979) have argued for increasing

salience of the deception topic as a means of vitiating the artificiality of the laboratory research design. Logic suggests that a curvilinear relationship might be discovered between degree of salience of the deception task and consistency in deception behaviors, especially when a correlation between anxiety and discrepancy, and behaviors which are interpreted as deceptive by observing audiences has been shown.

Another failure of the behavioral perspective which emerges from a review of the research literature is the distortion, in the research designs, of the notion of "time" or duration of a deceptive communication event. As Knapp and Comadena (1979) noted, deception research frequently considers a communication act of relatively short duration, sometimes as short as 15 to 20 seconds (for example, the PONS test developed by Zuckerman, Rosenthal et al). Cody and O'Hair (1983) suggested, a better knowledge of deceptive communicative behaviors would be gained by studying longer deceptive interactions.

Knapp and Comadena (1979) called for deceptive communication studies to consider more carefully the occasion or context in which the deception occurs. This factor is difficult to control or manipulate in a laboratory setting. Most studies in this review involved single event participations by performers and/or audience members. Since Brandt, Miller and Hocking (1980) noted a relationship between familiarity of decoding audiences with performers' typical behavior patterns, there might also be shown a

relationship between the familiarity or strangeness of the communicators across time and their deceptive patterns.

Scene

The context or "scene" of deceptive communication takes into consideration the physical factors which determine the ecological validity of a research design. In this review only Kraut and Poe's (1980) manipulation of customs officials and Hayano's (1980) observation of poker players studied subjects engaged in deception in their natural environments. Almost all of the studies surveyed here, and in Zuckerman et al's (1981) review, were conducted in "laboratory" situations. In addition, several studies included the use, or feigned use, of mechanical devices for monitoring physiological reactions to deception. For example, Cunningham (1977) and Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance and Rosenthal (1979) led their performers to believe their reactions were being recorded by an instrument measuring galvanic skin responses (GSR). It might be argued that the presence of machinery like a polygraph could, in itself, increase anxiety and correlative behaviors which are frequently identified with deception.

The potential effect of the presence of machinery from polygraphs to video recording devices on the "natural" behavior of laboratory subjects deserves closer study. Several studies attempted to reduce the interference of technical equipment by recording the deceptive communication event unobtrusively through one-way mirrors. In studies

using the Exline et al (1970) design, special attention was drawn to the potential duplicity of the one-way mirror by the research confederate. In a number of studies, the communication event occurred between a human performer and a machine. For example, Buck, Miller, Savin, and Caul (1972) videotaped facial responses to slides as their sample of deceptive behavior. In a number of studies, the performer created his/her deceptive communication for a human partner with the knowledge that he/she was being recorded. In Matarazzo, Wiens, Jackson, and Manaugh's (1970) design, performers were interviewed by audience decoders, who rated the performer's veracity, at the same time the interview was being recorded by Interaction Recorder to study speech patterns during deception.

In some studies, like the Matarazzo et al (1970), the evaluation of the veracity of the performance was made directly by participating audiences; in other studies the evaluation of veracity was made indirectly, through the one-way mirror, by hidden observers other than the participant in the communicative event. Still other studies obtained decoding scores from audiences who saw or heard only a mechanically reproduced deceptive message. To the extent that these differences in "scene" or situational context might affect the behavior of the performers, or the sensitivity of audiences, generalizability of results is difficult.

The problems inherent in behavioral research in deception insinuated by this analysis of the treatment

of personal context, the "Act", and physical context, the "Scene" of the deceptive communication event by many studies to date, suggest the need for more studies in the "field", in the communicative participants' "natural" environment; taking into account the initial degree of familiarity of the participants, the duration of their interaction, and the number of deceptive messages exchanged during their interaction.

Agency

The most frequently manipulated variable in the deception research paradigm is the channel or medium of communication, identified here with Burke's "agency". Three basic types of manipulation surfaced in this review of the research literature: the isolation of physiological behaviors, via mechanical measurement of performers (for example, Cutrow, Parks, Lucas, and Thomas, 1972), the isolation of nonverbal behaviors, via restrictions of visual information available to the audience decoders (especially in the Ekman and Friesen studies and the series of studies conducted by Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal and their colleagues), and the isolation of verbal behaviors, via audial or lingual analysis (for example, Streeter, Krauss, Geller, Olson, and Apple's 1977 study of pitch changes during deception; and Baskett and Freedle's 1974 study of linguistic pragmatics of degrees of belief). Research designs seem to have evolved from a focus on minute behaviors (Ekman and Friesen's "micromomentary movements", 1972), to a more global

analysis using multiple channels (Knapp, Hart, and Dennis' 1974 study, including nonverbal analyses, verbal analyses, and analyses of miscellaneous variables like time duration). DePaulo et al (1982) have acknowledged, after a detailed series of studies, that deception detection might not be possible from visual cues alone. Although most studies have used the visual cue design, more interest in the verbal/ lingual aspects of deception has been generated by Baskett and Freedle (1974), Knapp, Hart, and Dennis (1974), Todd-Mancillas and Kibler (1979), and Hopper and Bell (1984).

Returning to the dramatistic perspective assumed throughout this review, we can intuit the problems in generalizing from research designs which defy the holistic nature of a communication event. An audience member loses ability to participate in the communicative interaction when the stage lights go dark, or when the stage performer cannot be heard or seen clearly. Burke cautioned against the mis-application of the pentadic model by failing to consider the relationships or "ratios" of the elements to each other.

However, a call for more natural research designs including all channels of the communication event should not be considered a refutation of the contribution made by designs which focus on specific channels. Without the directions suggested by studies like Ekman and Friesen's or Rosenthal and his associates, we would not realize the extent of our dependence on a multiplicity of cues from which to construct a meaningful interaction with another.

A Model of Research Variables in Deceptive Communication

A visual representation of potential variables affecting the success or failure of a deceptive communication is offered. Three major divisions suggest the temporal linearity of any communication event, "Pre-communication Context", "Communication Context", and "Post-communication Context"; however, these divisions are not intended to suggest a causality about their interrelationship. Rather, elements which appear in a temporal space create a context for other elements which coexist with and follow them. The "Pre-communication Context" includes personal and ecological aspects which predispose a communication attitude and stimulate a communication event. The "Communication Context" is taken to include both the encoding and decoding of a communication message. "The Post-communication Context" refers to the changed state that exists between the communication participants after the message exchange.

Variables which imply a range of attributes rather than polar opposites are designated by an asterick (*). Variables which imply polarities, such as factual or affective valence, or positive or negative affective evaluation are also considered to reflect a range within the polar extremes.

The model is offered as a reference for future studies using the pentadic "ratios" method of analysis in investigating deceptive communication events.

A Model of Research Variables in Deceptive Communication

Pre-Communication Context	Communication Context		Post-Communication Context
	Encoding	Decoding	
Performer Attributes	Channel selection (single-multiple)	Channel accessability (single-multiple)	*Evaluation (benign-exploitive)
Audience Attributes	*Skill Level	*Skill Level	*Response (ignore-expose)
*Performer - Audience Relationship (Intimate-Stranger)	Posed - Spontaneous (Pre-meditation)	Naive - Suspicious (Cognition)	[the post-communiction context refers particularly to the rhetorical perspective; the success or failure of the deception pre-disposes the future of the communication relationship]
*Occasion	*Topic Salience (Consequence)	*Topic Salience (Consequence)	
*Setting (Direct-Indirect Contact)	*Duration of Message	*Time to Process	
*Ecological interference			

after Hopper and Bell (1984)

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